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This article discusses theoretical concepts with regard to informal networks in the 
Russian and Norwegian society and higher education institutions (HEI) in particular. 
Informal networks are operative in both public and private organizations criss-cross-
ing social and job-related networks within these organizations. Formal and informal 
contacts between representatives of HEIs in the Barents region are often the result of 
years of close cooperation on student exchange, research projects and joint academic 
programmes. The aim of this study is to explain theoretical perspectives in relation to 
informal networks from a Norwegian and a Russian perspective. Understanding both 
perspectives is essential before describing informal networks across different HEIs in 
the Barents region and valuable if we seek to study the impact of informal networks 
on the formal decision-making process. Informal networks are perceived differently 
because the formal structure in which they operate is different. Analysing the formal 
structure is therefore suggested in order to better understand the different perspectives 
surrounding formal/informal networks.
Keywords: formal networks, informal networks, higher education institutions, formal 
structure, Barents region
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INTRodUCTIoN
This article contributes to the debate on challenges and opportunities faced by in-
ternational higher education faces in the twenty-first century by analysing two theo-
retical perspectives on informal networks. Formal and informal contacts between 
representatives of higher education institutions (HEIs) in the Barents region – to be 
distinguished from informal networks – are often the result of years of close coop-
eration on student exchange, research projects and joint academic programmes. The 
primary intention of educational collaboration in the Barents region was initially to 
ensure good neighbourly relations, economic and social development, and stabil-
ity (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011–2012). International collaboration 
across this region is most extensive between Norway and the Russian Federation 
(Hønneland 2009, 36), and educational cooperation is among the sectors where co-
operation has increased in recent years, despite different views with regard to the 
conflict in Ukraine. The increasing number of Russian students studying in Norway 
(NIFU 2015, 14) can be seen as a good indicator of this development. Moreover, the 
University of Nordland and seven Russian HEIs have established an international 
formal network to promote and develop a Bachelor’s programme in Circumpolar 
Studies (BCS). Seven of the eight HEIs are located in North-west Russia while the 
leading HEI is located in northern Norway. 
The focus in this article, however, is on informal networks, which are to be under-
stood as personalized grids such as network groups and criss-cross job-related and 
social networks. Identifying informal networks between representatives of HEIs across 
Norway and Russia is also one of the aims of the NORRUSS project “Higher education 
in the High North: Regional restructuring through educational exchanges and student 
mobility”. One of the research questions of the NORRUSS project is: What kind of 
informal networks are developed and maintained as a result of student exchange and 
by the educational institutions? (NORRUSS 2012, 6). The aim of this project is to study 
educational cooperation and student exchange between Norway and Russia through 
the context of the existing cooperation between the University of Nordland and seven 
institutions of higher education in Northwest Russia.
The term formal structure is used to distinguish public laws, organization charts, 
policy documents, regulations, and formal hierarchical procedures from more infor-
mal structures, such as norms, values, and social groups. Informal networks, crucially, 
are assumed to be understood differently in the Russian and Norwegian context. This 
article is an attempt to elaborate on this assumption by discussing two theoretical ap-
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proaches with regard to informal networks in Russian and Norwegian society and HEIs 
in particular. Understanding both perspectives is essential before describing informal 
networks across different HEIs in the Barents region and valuable if we seek to identify 
the outcomes of such networks or examine the extent to which their power or influence 
is guided by formal structures. Hence, society – including the administration of HEIs 
– is regarded as a system of interconnected formal and informal levels. As this article il-
lustrates, the relation between the formal structure and informal networks is perceived 
to be different in the Russian society compared to Norwegian society. 
The article starts with a background on the need to analyse informal networks within 
HEIs. This is followed by a Western theoretical perspective on formal and informal 
networks, as Norwegian perspectives are assumed to be heavily influenced by Western 
approaches. In this paper I use “the West” and “the Western World” as referring to a 
group of states sharing a more or less similar political and economic ideology such 
as the United States, Canada, members of the European Union / European Economic 
Area, Australia and New Zealand. A similar analysis from a Russian perspective will be 
outlined in the third part. The Russian perspective discussed below provides a rather 
different understanding of what an outsider might regard as a similar phenomenon. In 
the final section, I return to the objective of this study and discuss the differences and 
similarities between both approaches in more detail. 
INfoRmal NeTwoRkS wIThIN heIS
Organizations consist of formal and informal networks. The latter are not limited to the 
public or private sector or to a specific industrial sector such as education. Informal net-
works are also characterized as unstable, non-transparent and frequently criss-crossing 
job-related and social networks. Although the impact of these networks on organiza-
tional performance can vary, they are assumed to play an important role in the formal 
decision-making process of organizations, including HEIs located in the Barents region. 
For instance, informal networks, can have an impact on the stability of policy, as in how 
internationalization and academic practices are valued by HEIs over time. Informal net-
works are also assumed to have an impact on the attrition of key personnel such as deci-
sion-makers, patrons or so-called liaisons. Liaisons are by Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun 
(1979, 508) defined as individuals linking two or more clusters. These individuals, often 
operating at the centre knot, are perceived to have great power and influence within the 
informal network, more than the formal structure would grant them. With regard to the 
BCS cooperation, Sundet (2015), for instance, emphasizes the high turnover among the 
Russian participants of the network responsible for the coordination of this programme. 
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Hence, collaboration between HEIs can be affected if particular persons with a com-
mitment to international cooperation leave – or are forced to leave – the institution as 
discussed above, especially if informal networks influence the outcome of the decision-
making process to a larger extent than the formal ones. This is all the more urgent 
when these individuals are key persons with whom education institutions on the other 
side of the border over time have established good contact. In another example of the 
importance of individual contributions, Sokolov (2014, 10) argues that federal support 
for HEIs in Russia largely depends on the personal connections of the university’s top 
management. Informal networks can also act as a bestowal of trust or as an alternative 
to time-consuming formal procedures. In the former, informal networks could be re-
garded as builders of trust between partners from different nation states in educational 
cooperation. Educational cooperation between individuals across different states can 
create social networks based on trust gained after a long relationship. When issues re-
lating to admission rules, student requirements and approval of acquired credits need 
to be solved, trust can often be a decisive factor. However, as noted before, speaking of 
informal networks among representatives of Russian and Norwegian HEIs is problem-
atic, as from a strictly theoretical perspective, the term is understood differently.
Also, identifying informal networks across Norwegian and Russian HEIs in the Barents 
region can be challenging. Besides issues of data collection – would people consider 
themselves to be members of an “informal network” and how are such shadow networks 
understood by staff across different levels of an organization – these “hidden” informal 
networks often leave no traces or track record (Ledeneva 2013, 16; Lauth 2010, 38). 
Furthermore, even if managers are often not even aware of the existence or the outcome 
of informal network(s) within their organization, organizations – whether private or 
state controlled – are often reluctant to provide relevant data on the performance and 
development of informal networks (Sanders, Snijders and Stokman 1998, 105). Rather 
than revealing informal networks as such, for example by identifying participants or 
discussing power structures, this article will therefore discuss the different theoretical 
concepts in relation to such networks. This will also illustrate how such concepts could 
have a different impact on the daily lives of people working at HEIs in the Barents 
region.  
The main argument here is that describing or comparing informal networks across 
different states in the Barents region is challenging because of different theoretical 
understandings of these networks. Actors from different institutions interpret infor-
mal networks differently, not only from a theoretical point of view, but also from an 
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empirical vantage point as is illustrated by an analysis of the data collection in relation 
to the NORRUSS project. For example, when asked about the role of networks within 
educational collaboration, representatives of Russian HEIs frequently cited “trust” as 
a key concept whereas Norwegian interviewees would emphasize “personal commit-
ment” and “knowing the right people”. Interviews with representatives of Norwegian 
and Russian HEIs for the purpose of the NORRUSS project were conducted between 
January 2013 and February 2015. Summing up, from a Russian theoretical perspec-
tive, informal networks are understood to be more than personal contact during social 
activities between participants of formal meetings, as discussed below. 
INfoRmal NeTwoRkS fRom a NoRweGIaN peRSpeCTIve
Before discussing informal networks from a Russian perspective, this section provides 
a brief overview of intra-organizational studies of informal networks by Western re-
searchers. As “individual interest” was a rather insufficient explanation for the pres-
ence and development of informal networks over time, there emerged increasing 
scientific interest in contributing to the debate on informal networks (Reif, Monczka 
and Newstrom 1973, 389; Sanders, Snijders and Stokman 1998, 105; Stevenson and 
Bartunek 1996, 76). 
Generally, research from a Western perspective on informal networks has two main 
concerns, one aiming to disclose informal networks, their members, roles, and power 
structures (see, for instance, Rigby for a detailed study of the network around Stalin) 
and the other studying the outcomes of these networks, including the effectiveness of 
informal power structures in organizational performance. Most of this intra-organ-
izational research has been focused on private institutions – mainly operating in the 
Western world – whereas organizations largely controlled by the state such as HEIs, 
and especially organizations operating in Russia are underrepresented. Most of the 
studies discussed below are therefore based on organizations operating in the private 
sector and in a few cases state controlled enterprises.
Organizations can be understood as social groupings with relatively stable patterns 
of interaction over time. Social interaction may lead to the development of networks, 
for instance, between individuals sharing similar cultural viewpoints (Stevenson and 
Bartunek 1996, 76). Such networks are by Mitchell (1969, 2) defined as “a specific set 
of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the char-
acteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social behavior of 
the persons involved.” The best example of a formal network within an organization 
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is the organizational map, showing the relationship between a manager and his or her 
employees or between departments and divisions across an organization. In many clas-
sical works (especially within the positional tradition), networks or their outcomes are 
often studied by analysing the formal relations between different people and groups 
based on their formal positions or roles, for instance by reference to the organizational 
chart. The positional tradition has been criticized for neglecting individual contribu-
tions and for failure to grasp the ongoing process in organizations (Tichy, Tushman and 
Fombrun 1979, 511; Krackhardt and Hanson 1993, 111). Formal networks fail to grasp 
the ongoing process in organizations because power and influence are not necessarily 
exercised through formal networks (Cobb 1986, 234; Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun 
1979, 511). Influential “hidden” networks are not visible on the organizational chart 
although studies explaining how the work actually gets done within an organization 
emphasize the importance of these networks (Flap, Bulder and Völker 1998, 131) and 
how power or influence is frequently channelled through them (Groat 1997, 41; Tichy, 
Fushman and Fombrun 1979, 511). These “hidden” networks or “informal organiza-
tions” often explained as alternative networks among employees from different levels in 
order to fulfil, for instance, unexpected complex or highly variable tasks (Krackhardt 
and Hanson 1993, 104). According to Groat (1997, 40), the informal organization 
encompasses all the channels of interaction and relationships that exist in an organi-
zation outside the organization’s formal management structure. Tichy, Tushman and 
Fombrun (1979, 509-510) distinguish four types of such relations – exchange of affect, 
exchange of power and influence, exchange of information and exchange of goods or 
services – and argue that the dichotomy formal/informal is reflected in all these link-
ages. Thus, informal networks are understood as something more than “knowing the 
right people” or “personal contacts” based on a long-term relationship. Moreover, they 
should not be confused with the culture of an organization. Groat (1994, 40) argues that 
informal networks expand “quickly” and adapt to changing circumstances in contrast 
to the rather slower pace of an organization’s culture. Stevenson and Bartunek (1996, 
75) define organizational culture as “the meanings and understandings that members 
share about their work and the expression of these meanings in particular behaviours”. 
Informal networks are often associated with negative impact such as ineffectiveness, 
corruption, shadow deals, etc. Such networks, however, can also serve as a valuable re-
source for individual employees, for instance in finding solutions to satisfying individ-
ual needs (Reif, Monczka and Newstrom 1973, 389; Groat 1997, 41) and as a means of 
communication, cohesion, and protection of integrity (Barnard 1962). In fact, informal 
networks may counterbalance some of the presumably negative aspects. They can fight 
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corruption through internal systems of checks and balances (Ledeneva 2013, 249). In 
addition to the individual level, informal networks can be a major source of strength 
and added value for the organization as a whole (Groat 1997, 41). Flap, Bulder and 
Völker (1998, 109) even argue that informal networks are an equally important factor 
of production as the organizations’ financial capital, buildings, and staff. Consequently, 
acquiring skills to understand and deal with informal networks becomes an essential 
part of the management practices for an organization’s decision-makers. 
Studies of informal networks were typically based on the idea that the informal or-
ganization is more effective in terms of organizational performance than the formal 
organization. In practice, formal hierarchies and informal networks can overlap and 
sometimes even be in conflict. As concluded before, increasing interest has since been 
shown in research to describe informal networks (for example by examining those who 
are included or who, in the words of Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun (1979, 508), is seen 
as “the liaison” or “the bridge” of the network – the individual who is a member of 
multiple clusters). Similarly, more research has been devoted to study the performance 
of informal networks (see, for instance, Reif, Monczka and Newstrom 1973, 390–391).
Instead of emphasizing the needs or benefits for the individual or organization, Argyris 
(1957), Groat (1997) and more recently Alena Ledeneva (2013) from a Russian perspec-
tive, seek to explain the development of informal networks from a different premise. 
They argue that complexities of the formal structure lead to the development of infor-
mal social groups that are necessary, as Groat (1997, 41) puts it, to “fill the gap”. The 
formal structure, for instance, could include complicated and time-consuming internal 
reporting procedures or incoherent formal regulations enacted by the legislator. These 
internal procedures are then bypassed in order to ensure that a particular deadline is 
being met. Groat’s perspective is strongly related to Ledeneva’s Russian perspective that 
I will outline below. Groat (1997, 41) emphasizes the lack of formal structure in the 
following example: 
Thus if a company has no proper system for staff development and 
appraisal, then when an internal transfer is being mooted, the only 
way information on the candidate can pass is by informal personal 
contacts between managers, and the only way internal candidates 
can find opportunities to move around is by keeping an ear to the 
ground on their “network”.’ 
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Ledeneva emphasizes the absence of a well-functioning formal structure in her study 
of informal networks in Russian society. Her angle is slightly different from most of the 
perspectives discussed in this section where the main focus is on individual contribu-
tions or organizational performance as an explanation for the abundance or develop-
ment of informal networks. Assuming that my interpretation of Ledeneva’s work is 
correct, informal networks in Russian society are necessary to ensure the functioning 
of society. In line with Groat’s perspective, she holds that the formal framework does 
not function sufficiently in practice, which forces individuals to find alternatives out-
side the formal hierarchy in order to deal with their daily issues. Ledeneva’s approach 
fits neatly with the growing interest for research addressing the use of informal net-
works as a way of getting things done within an organization (Flap, Bulder and Völker 
1998, 132). By explaining the relationship between the formal structure and informal 
networks in Russian society, Ledeneva offers a valuable element to the debate on the 
impact or outcome of informal networks. In her terms, these are “power” networks 
(Ledeneva 2013, 4) or “personal” networks (Ledeneva 2013, 30). My conclusion is that 
Ledeneva uses the term “power networks” to emphasize the influence these networks 
have on the decision-making process in Russian society.
INfoRmal NeTwoRkS fRom a RUSSIaN peRSpeCTIve
Ledeneva is one of the few authors to explain the use of informal networks in Russian 
society from a Russian perspective (Ledeneva 2013, 50–84). Ledeneva – and to a cer-
tain degree Pastukhov (2002) – discuss values and barriers of informal networks in 
Russian society but also how informal networks are related to formal institutions. Their 
studies are more detailed than Groat’s perspective especially in terms of how formal 
and informal networks can have an impact on the daily lives of individuals and formal 
organizations. The aim of this section is first to explain Russian perspectives of person-
alized networks and second to elaborate these perspectives to HEIs operating in Russia.
Ledeneva’s (2013, 252–253) main argument is that informal practices such as the use 
of informal personal contacts in order to circumvent formal institutions such as bu-
reaucratic procedures or regulations are an obstacle on Russia’s path to modernization. 
Although the focus is on informal networks, informal practices can include a vari-
ety of activities from selective enforcement of formal rules to personalized networks. 
Selective enforcement, or custom law, is understood as the use or abuse of the legal 
framework to serve interests outside the legal domain, violating the spirit of the law, 
not its letter (Ledeneva 2006, 12–14; Pastukhov 2002, 71; Lauth 2000, 40). Before deal-
ing with informal networks in Russian society in more detail, it is necessary to briefly 
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discuss some characteristics of the formal structure, such as formal laws and bureau-
cratic procedures but also hierarchical structures or procedures for internal reporting 
in Russia. 
The formal framework is differently understood in Russia than in the West. In Russia 
there is a difference, for instance, between the written word and practical realities. Law 
and justice – to be understood as norms representing what is regarded as fair and not – 
are not necessarily the same. In the Western world and Northwest Europe in particular 
laws and formal systems are – at least by the majority of the population – regarded as 
fair and just. 
A second explanation for the gap between formal structure and the situation in 
practice is that in Russia formal regulations and bureaucratic procedures can be 
difficult to comply with. Formal regulations can be complicated, not just because 
the text itself is unclear, but because of inconsistency between regulations from 
different governmental levels and because of the enforcement strategy of Russian 
regulatory agencies in general.  The principle “everybody is guilty unless prove not 
guilty”, which is embedded in the enforcement strategy outlined by Pastukhov (2002, 
70–71), is a good example of this approach. The literature provides many examples of 
this (Pastukhov 2002; Gustafson 2012; Ledeneva 2006; 2008). The formal structure, 
such as law but also internal formal procedures can be so complex and demanding 
(requiring a new application procedure if there is any minor change or mistake in the 
initial version) that organizations or individuals have to consciously or unconsciously 
bypass the formal procedure, for instance, by faking the documents (Pastukhov 2002, 
73). Relevant examples for the education sector can be found in Sandler (2014, 18), 
and Balzer (2010, 59–60), identifying the challenges of Russia’s educational system 
in terms of visa requirements, registration procedures, and employment rules for 
foreign specialists. 
The formal framework of Russian society is complicated, compared to that of Norway, 
for example, it was not created at once but was rather driven by changing political ide-
ologies and economic development of a country which was first a prominent member 
of the Soviet Union and is now considered to be a country of rapid economic develop-
ment. Since 2001, Russia has been counted as one of the four big emerging economies, 
so-called BRIC countries. The “BRIC countries” are Brazil, Russia, India and China, 
all seen as having reached a stage of rapid economic development (Goldman, Sachs & 
Co. 2001). Each period, from the ruling Communist Party through the Yeltsin years 
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and later under Vladimir Putin’s first two terms as president, introduced a new set of 
laws and policies, without necessarily replacing the ones that came before (Gustafson 
2012, 385). A result of these complexities is that personal networks are valuable and 
sometimes even necessary to get things done, not only for officials but also for ordinary 
citizens (Ledeneva 2013, 253). In Russia, such networks are often taken for granted 
and hence differently understood than in Western societies where they are frequently 
associated with shadow deals, corruption, or bribes. 
Informal practices such as personalized networks did not first emerge under Vladimir 
Putin’s terms as president. During the Soviet Union formal laws, rules, and procedures 
were frequently bypassed to obtain particular goods and services in short supply, or 
simply in order to comply with the formal demands (Ledeneva 1998, 3). These prac-
tices were called blat and became a tradition in Russian society, perhaps even a part 
of Russian culture, and when Russia during the 1990s was in its first years of eco-
nomic and social development, these practices that had been so useful during the 
Soviet period could and would not disappear overnight; and like most institutions in 
Russia during this particular period, HEIs faced financial and institutional difficulties 
(Androushchak 2014, 10). 
Hence, informal practices such as personalized networks are a part of Russian so-
ciety, or in Ledeneva’s (2013, 50) terms, part of Russia’s sistema. Ledeneva (2013, 
81–83) describes these networks as channels of informal governance for allocating 
resources. “Useful friends” or “core contacts” gain such benefits as access to particular 
resources (ibid). In Ledeneva’s view, informal networks are characterized by unwrit-
ten rules and informal codes, and are channelled by a power concentrated on the top 
(patron) or gatekeeper (ibid.). Ledeneva (2013, 83) argues that informal networks 
are frequently based on personal loyalty towards the patron and can have their own 
system of checks and balances regarding responsibility and punishment. Informal 
relationships of trust and alliances matter and provide, ironically enough, more “sta-
bility”, “protection” and “predictability” than the formal institutions, which relates 
to the limited performance of the state in protecting individual rights (Ledeneva 
2013, 83; Lauth 2000, 28). It is the patron or kinship structure rather than the formal 
structure that can provide “useful friends” or “core contacts” not only with stability, 
protection and predictability but also a helping hand to deal with the complicated 
formal structure. Using personal networks should not be regarded as an informal 
practice as such, but when personal networks are used – consciously or not – in order 
to circumvent formal procedures because the formal framework is not able to fulfil 
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the demand or is practically impossible to comply with, or when such networks are 
used to exercise power or influence rather than through the formal hierarchy, such 
practices are to be understood as informal practices.
Thus, according to a Russian perspective, belonging to a network community which 
builds on loyalty towards a patron, political party, or association could secure the 
opportunities or fulfil the needs that should be guaranteed by formal institutions 
“under normal circumstances”. Examples are preferential appointments, state-support, 
business ventures, jobs, assistance in problem-solving, etc. This itself is not uniquely 
Russian and perhaps in some cases not even different from informal networks from 
a Western perspective as outlined above. What is different is the extent to which in-
formal networks from a Russian perspective need to compensate for the weakness of 
the formal institutions. The need to provide trust and support in a relatively less stable 
environment is – from a Russian point of view – considered more significant.
Informal networks, whether we call them power networks or personalized networks, 
are embedded in both public and private sectors and are therefore assumed to be part 
of the decision-making process in Russian HEIs as well. The administration of a federal 
or state university is perceived to face the same challenges as most other organizations, 
corporations, or individuals in terms of dealing with the challenges and opportunities of 
the formal structure, e.g. to comply with regulations and strategies, or to follow formal 
procedures. Although more research needs to be done on how informal networks in-
fluence the decision-making process of HEIs in Russia, it is – based on the theoretical 
overview discussed above – assumed that informal networks play an important role 
in the decision-making process of these institutions. This is not necessarily in terms 
of bypassing particular local or federal regulations or circumventing time-consuming 
bureaucratic procedures to ensure that a particular deadline is met, but in terms of 
personalized networks through which influence, power, or goods are channelled.
CoNClUSIoN
The aim of this article has been to illustrate two different theoretical perspectives with 
regard to informal networks: a Norwegian (Western) and a Russian perspective. If we 
seek to study the outcome or importance of informal networks within educational in-
stitutions across different states – even if these institutions cooperate closely with each 
other within one geographical region as we have seen with educational cooperation in 
the Barents region  – we first need to understand how such networks are understood in 
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both states, and how they have a different impact on the daily lives of the citizens. Such 
different perspectives, as outlined in this study, make it challenging to argue for the 
existence of one common informal network, study the impact of informal networks on 
internationalization processes, or identify the participants of such networks. 
Both theoretical perspectives emphasize the effectiveness of informal networks in 
achieving personal objectives or in circumventing formal procedures. Informal net-
works can often explain the discrepancy between actual behaviour and the formal 
framework – or formal institutions. While informal networks are publicly recognized 
both in Russian and Norwegian society – including HEIs – it is complicated to iden-
tify their outcomes because their configuration or development is difficult to observe 
empirically. Future research is therefore needed in order to determine the exact role of 
these networks with regard to decision-making processes in higher education. If we 
seek to understand the differences in both perspectives, however, we should analyse the 
formal structure rather than the informal network(s). Informal networks are perceived 
differently because the formal framework in which they operate is different. The com-
plexities of the formal framework of Russian society is one of the main explanations 
for the formation of informal social groups, whereas from a Norwegian/Western per-
spective individual preferences or assumptions seeking to explain the role of informal 
networks in the formal decision-making process are seen as major contributors for the 
development of networks outside the formal structure. 
As one of the few Western scholars Groat (1997, 40) emphasizes a link between the 
formal structure and the development of informal networks by arguing that the short-
comings of the formal “organization” result in the creation and shaping of informal 
networks. As concluded before, however, most research from a Western perspective is 
focused on the outcomes of informal networks or on the role of the individual within 
these networks (individual demands and needs as means to solving unexpected prob-
lems). Although Groat (1997, 41) addresses the weaknesses of the formal structure as 
an explanation for the development of informal networks, a broader study of Western 
literature with regard to these networks illustrates a different premise than Ledeneva’s 
Russian perspective. Ledeneva and to a certain extent Groat suggest that when the 
formal structure does not function well enough in practice, individuals are basically 
forced to find alternatives outside the formal framework in order to fulfil their demands 
or deal with their daily issues. It is in the formal structure not being able to fulfil the 
demand for stability, protection, and predictability that we can find an explanation for 
why informal networks are perceived differently in Russia and the West. In Groat’s 
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(1997, 41) words, “the formal gap that needs to be bridged” is simply bigger in Russian 
society and therefore, has a different impact on the employees’ daily lives. 
To illustrate some of these impacts – while also acknowledging that informal networks 
are extremely hard to monitor – let us assume that informal networks are operative 
among employees of a particular university in the Barents region, and that individu-
als within these networks have a substantial influence on the outcomes of the formal 
decision-making process. Such a network is obviously larger than one person – say the 
rector – and could include several people in key positions, for instance vice-rectors and 
coordinators of international cooperation. If, one network and its members (patron, 
liaisons and/or bow ties as “a network in which many players are dependent on a single 
employee but not on each other” defined by Krackhardt and Hanson 1993, 111) is sub-
stituted by another network with its own members, this could have an impact on the 
policy or strategy of the HEI in question, for instance in the field of internationaliza-
tion, especially when the network swap affects individuals which whom foreign partner 
institutions have over time established good contact. Such an argument is based on the 
assumption that Russian society consists of several networks each with its own patron. 
In the alternative version people would compete with each other within one network, 
something that would be in conflict with the members’ loyalty towards the patron, 
Ledeneva (2013, 38–39) describes this as an essential characteristic of these informal 
networks.
Further research is needed, however, to determine to what extent informal networks 
influence the outcomes of the decision-making process of HEIs in the Barents region, 
for example in terms of internationalization. Future research could also clarify whether 
we can identify an international informal network of representatives from different 
HEIs across the Barents region – as one of the questions surrounding the NORRUSS 
project suggests – and whether the theoretical perspectives outlined in this study are 
relevant and applicable to such a network. 
Finally, as this article suggests, informal networks are not uniquely Russian. What is 
uniquely Russian, however, is their nature: the relationship of informal networks with 
the formal structure. Understanding this relationship is essential before identifying or 
comparing informal networks across different states in the Barents region and valuable 
if we seek to explore the outcomes of these networks, or examine the degree to which 
their actions are guided by formal structures. 
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